

Repeated Coordination with Private Learning



Bio: Prof Kalyan Chatterjee is Distinguished Professor of Economics and Management Science at the Pennsylvania State University, USA and was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2003. He works in many different areas of economic theory, such as bargaining, R&D, self-control preferences, social networks and is interested in many more

Prof Kalyan Chatterjee

Distinguished Professor of Economics
and Management Science

Abstract: We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true state from private signals, as well as the actions of others. They commonly learn the true state (Cripps et al., 2008), but do not coordinate in every equilibrium. We show that there exist stable equilibria in which players can overcome unfavorable signal realizations and eventually coordinate the correct action, for any discount factor. For high discount factors, we show that in addition players can also achieve efficient payoffs.

Keywords: repeated games, coordination, learning.

Date: **6 June 2019, Thursday**

Time: **03:00 – 4:30 pm**

Venue: **A 106, R & D Block**

